3 research outputs found
Matrix Multiplicative Weights Updates in Quantum Zero-Sum Games: Conservation Laws & Recurrence
Recent advances in quantum computing and in particular, the introduction of
quantum GANs, have led to increased interest in quantum zero-sum game theory,
extending the scope of learning algorithms for classical games into the quantum
realm. In this paper, we focus on learning in quantum zero-sum games under
Matrix Multiplicative Weights Update (a generalization of the multiplicative
weights update method) and its continuous analogue, Quantum Replicator
Dynamics. When each player selects their state according to quantum replicator
dynamics, we show that the system exhibits conservation laws in a
quantum-information theoretic sense. Moreover, we show that the system exhibits
Poincare recurrence, meaning that almost all orbits return arbitrarily close to
their initial conditions infinitely often. Our analysis generalizes previous
results in the case of classical games.Comment: NeurIPS 202
No-Regret Learning and Equilibrium Computation in Quantum Games
As quantum processors advance, the emergence of large-scale decentralized
systems involving interacting quantum-enabled agents is on the horizon. Recent
research efforts have explored quantum versions of Nash and correlated
equilibria as solution concepts of strategic quantum interactions, but these
approaches did not directly connect to decentralized adaptive setups where
agents possess limited information. This paper delves into the dynamics of
quantum-enabled agents within decentralized systems that employ no-regret
algorithms to update their behaviors over time. Specifically, we investigate
two-player quantum zero-sum games and polymatrix quantum zero-sum games,
showing that no-regret algorithms converge to separable quantum Nash equilibria
in time-average. In the case of general multi-player quantum games, our work
leads to a novel solution concept, (separable) quantum coarse correlated
equilibria (QCCE), as the convergent outcome of the time-averaged behavior
no-regret algorithms, offering a natural solution concept for decentralized
quantum systems. Finally, we show that computing QCCEs can be formulated as a
semidefinite program and establish the existence of entangled (i.e.,
non-separable) QCCEs, which cannot be approached via the current paradigm of
no-regret learning
Evolutionary Game Theory Squared: Evolving Agents in Endogenously Evolving Zero-Sum Games
The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally
online learning in games is based on a clear distinction between a population
of dynamic agents that interact given a fixed, static game. In this paper, we
move away from the artificial divide between dynamic agents and static games,
to introduce and analyze a large class of competitive settings where both the
agents and the games they play evolve strategically over time. We focus on
arguably the most archetypal game-theoretic setting -- zero-sum games (as well
as network generalizations) -- and the most studied evolutionary learning
dynamic -- replicator, the continuous-time analogue of multiplicative weights.
Populations of agents compete against each other in a zero-sum competition that
itself evolves adversarially to the current population mixture. Remarkably,
despite the chaotic coevolution of agents and games, we prove that the system
exhibits a number of regularities. First, the system has conservation laws of
an information-theoretic flavor that couple the behavior of all agents and
games. Secondly, the system is Poincar\'{e} recurrent, with effectively all
possible initializations of agents and games lying on recurrent orbits that
come arbitrarily close to their initial conditions infinitely often. Thirdly,
the time-average agent behavior and utility converge to the Nash equilibrium
values of the time-average game. Finally, we provide a polynomial time
algorithm to efficiently predict this time-average behavior for any such
coevolving network game.Comment: To appear in AAAI 202